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,., ., . 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it dete1mined that the 
best interests of SS support an award of custody to Foreman? 
The magistrate's belief that SS was "consistently and significantly 
unhappy living with his father on the family farm" was unsupported 
by substantial evidence. . ........ . 
The magistrate's belief that SS did not like his new stepmother, 
Michelle Sweet, was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
The magistrate's belief that SS wanted to live with Foreman and 
her boyfriend, Ryan Cornwell, in Spokane, was unsupported by 
substantial evidence. 
The facts do not support an award of custody to Foreman because 
the interests of the child are best served where he will experience 
stability and continuity, and is encouraged to have frequent and 
continuing contact with both parents. 
Was it an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow Sweet to present 
evidence in support of his motion to reconsider? 
Whether the magistrate could hear Sweet's motion 
to reconsider after a final judgment had been entered was not 
preserved for appeal. 
The court is required to hear a motion to reconsider after a final 
judgment had been entered, so long as it is timely filed within 
14 days of entry of the final judgment. 
It was an abuse of discretion not to consider or allow new 
evidence in support of Sweet's motion to reconsider. 
Sweet, not Foreman, is entitled to I. C. §12-121 attorney fees 
on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
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matter. Respondent's contains the following factual errors: 
1. "Michelle Sweet ... resides in an apartment that Sweet owns in Spokane, Washington." 
Respondent's brief p. 1, LI. 18-19. Sweet and Michelle both testified that Michelle resided with 
Sweet and SS in Bonner's Ferry, Idaho, and also stayed at Sweet's apartment in Spokane. Tr. 
05121/15, p. 12, LI. 22; p. 135, Ll. 20-21. Michelle used the apartment because it was close to the 
school she attended. Tr. 5/21115 p. 186, Li. 19-20. 
2. " ... [F]rom October, 2012, to current, the primary issue has been Sweet's anger and that 
impact upon S.S." Respondent's Brief, p. 2, Ll. 4-5. This is presented as a statement of fact, but 
belongs more properly in the argument section of Foreman's brief. Sweet objects to the 
characterization, where issues include Foreman's several instances of kidnapping and custodial 
interference, Foreman's instability in her employment, residences and roommates, and Foreman's 
continuous and perjurous attempts to obtain a temporary restraining order against Sweet, including 
her allegations of emotional and physical abuse. The primary issue was, and still is, the need for 
SS to experience continuity and stability, and for him also to have continuing and frequent contact 
with both parents. 
3. " ... Michelle Sweet's drinking problems which include drinking 6-7 bottles of wine ... " 
Respondent's brief p. 3, Ll. 15-16. is not a found fact Instead, it is an example of 
Foreman's self-serving testimony where she alleges hearsay statements made by SS, and the 
allegation was not factually found or substantiated in any way. 
4. " ... Michellewouldmakefun SS ... " Respondent'sbrief,p. 3, 17-18. Respondent's 
not to statement not 
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Foreman was person recording which was introduced into evidence 
and admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit 12. Sweet's ire was caused by Foreman's 
, .. ,.,,auJtuu,,.; him at the exchange, and the subsequent refusal of police to arrest Foreman on 
Christmas Day. Tr. 06/04/15, p. 85, Ll. 1-6. 
" ... Cy Thompson, reported that there was no concerns with Sweet having custody. That 
information was provided oniy after the Court issued its final opinion ... " Respondent's brief, p. 
8, Ll.21-22. The report of Si Thompson, SS' counselor, was admitted into evidence at trial, as 
Exhibit Tr. 6/ 4/ 15, p. 88, Ll. 11-14. 
REPLY ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined that the best interests of SS 
support an award of custody to Foreman? 
a) The magistrate's belief that SS was "consistently and significantly unhappy 
living with his father on the family farm" was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
b) The magistrate's belief that SS did not like his new stepmother, Michelle 
Sweet, was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
c) The magistrate's belief that SS wanted to live with Foreman and her 
boyfriend, Ryan Cornwell, in Spokane was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
d) The facts do not support an award of custody to Foreman because the 
interests of the child are best served where he will experience stability and continuity, and is 
encouraged to have frequent and continuing contact with both parents. 
it an not 
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motion to reconsider? 
a 
judgment had been entered was not preserved for appeal. 
b) The court is required to hear a motion to reconsider after a final judgment 
had been entered, so long as it is timely filed within 14 days of entry of the final judgment. 
c) It was an abuse of discretion not to consider or allow new evidence in support 
of Sweet's motion to reconsider. 
3. Foreman is not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I. C. §12-121 on appeal. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined that the best interests of SS 
support an award of custody to Foreman? 
Foreman's brief states: "Appellant cites Suter v. Biggers, 157 Idaho 542, 549, 337 P.2d 
1271, 1278 (2014), with the position that the strong ties to the Bonners Ferry area should have 
overruled all other factors." This is a gross misstatement of Sweet's argument: 
SS' interests are best served by custody remaining with Sweet, who has married 
and remains living in his home at the family farm. SS has lived on the farm for all 
but fourteen months since he was born. SS sees his grandparents on a daily basis, 
and enjoys significant ties with family, community, church and school. In Suter v. 
Biggers, infra, the trial court correctly concluded that a move would disrupt the 
children's connections, and that they should remain where they were well 
established in their community, had strong friendships in the area and at school, and 
participated in sports, 4-H, church, and rodeos. Suter v. Biggers, 157 Idaho 542, at 
549, 337 P.3d 1271, at 1278 (2014). Similarly in this case, SS has strong ties to 
the small town of Bonner's Ferry, lives next door to his grandparents, and has lots 
friends he has known for years. These connections would inevitably be 
disrupted by a move to Washington. 
Appellant's brief, 18, LI. 9-18. Foreman also further misquotes Appellant: "To argue Judge 
Julian 'glossed over the past behaviors of Foreman' ... " Respondent's brief, p. 8, LI. 4-5. 
Respondent does not provide a for this This 1s a 
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and is not 
outset 
especially, what Sweet is not arguing. concedes that the issue is one of discretion, and that 
the magistrate acted within the outer boundaries of his discretion. Sweet concedes that the 
magistrate appears to have considered every relevant factor in his deliberations, including 
Foreman's deliberate deception, false allegations of every kind of abuse, custodial interference, 
lack of stability, previous neglect and child endangerment, and the fact that she has a history of 
ignoring court orders. The magistrate also appears to have considered the fact that SS has lived 
in, and attended school at, Bonner's Ferry all his life, that Sweet actually does not abuse SS, the 
strong relationship between SS and his grandparents, school, friends, church and community ties 
Bonners Ferry, and to have made the custody award in spite of all the above factors. 
Sweet's argument is that there is not substantial evidence supporting the magistrate's 
"abiding belief" that SS is consistently unhappy with Sweet, that SS didn't like his new stepmother 
Michelle Sweet, or that SS actually wished to live with Foreman; and even if the magistrate did not 
abuse his discretion in so finding, that this hypothesis was insufficient to support a change of 
custody when all the other factors are considered. Therefore the lower court did not properly 
apply the facts to the law, and did not reach its decision via an exercise ofreason. 
a) The magistrate's belief that SS was "consistently and significantly unhappy living 
with his father on the family farm" was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Sweet agrees that SS has been significantly unhappy at various times throughout this long 
custody battle between his parents, however Sweet does not believe the child is consistently 





the 2ih of August Ms. Foreman called me, wanted to take [SS] school 
shopping, and--cause she hadn't seen him since the fair, and I asked [SS] and he 
said "No dad I don't wanna go shoppin." So he, uh, she called back two or three 
times, and finaHy I said, "[SS] you need to talk to her, if you don't wanna go that's 
fine." And he said, "Mom I'll go if you take me out," somewhere he knew in 
Sandpoint, to eat. So my mom brought him down to the cop shop here and she 
took off with him and never brought him back. And I had a piece of paper for her 
to sign, and it said she could have him from noon till six o'clock on Wednesday 
. "7th August 2 ~· ... 
5/21/15,p. 162, LI. 21-25;p.163, LI. 1-3.1 Sweet's testimony continues: 
She didn't put her name, she just put sign here. And then I called and I called and 
I called and she wouldn't return-wouldn't answer my calls, wouldn't return, 
nothing. And I'm not sure what date, uh, I think it might have been the 28th or 29th, 
a lady that I know in Spokane, that works for the Court, called me and said, "Mr. 
Sweet, it says that you have a protection order in Spokane and you haven't been 
served." And I said, "No I haven't been served. I don't know what's goin on." 
And she said, "Well it looks like Ms. Foreman's at it again. Looks like she put 
down the wrong address, again, for where to serve you." And she ... give me the 
court date and all the particulars, and so I went to Spokane to fight the temporary 
protection order. And then we got, uh, got it in front of you get [SS] back. Um, 
we went to court the next Thursday. 
Tr. 5/21 I 1, p.160,LI. 6-15. Judge Julian found that Foreman " ... obtained SS under false pretences, 
signed a false name to the permission slip to ostensibly take SS shopping, withheld the existence of 
the TRO from Sweet, and gave the Spokane court a false Washington address for Sweet's 
of the TRO ... " R. I, 41, Ll. 
42, Ll. 1-3. These facts should support the inference that the child was unhappy as a result of the 
mother's custodial interference including the unanticipated and total disruption of [SS]' routine: 
[SS] was very confused, very upset, he didn't know what was goin on, he didn't 
QUOiarnJn marks and has been added where necessary to assist the court 
Notations of each instance are omitted to avoid the effect. 
BRIEF 5 
~n,1 W£>~at newuVHVVA 
cause had two or three counselors and CPS and everybody yanking 
and out of those over there, and so he was very confused. 
1 22-25; p. 178, According to the testimony, Sweet was never 
present when SS was observed to be unhappy; the counselors hired by Foreman never spoke with 
Sweet, and interviewed SS away from Sweet and away from the farm. There is evidence that SS 
was unhappy when he was being interviewed by counselors. Judge Julian commented: 
No mention is ever made to anyone by Foreman of the fact that she 
previously had and lost custody of SS due to her repeated violations of the terms of 
the custody order and her egregious parenting failure in January of20IO that could 
have cost SS his life. Foreman's deliberate deceptions and omissions to SS 
counselors and treatments providers have tainted the validity of their opinions and 
conclusions. Similarly, during the protection order hearing in Spokane in 2014, 
Foreman testified that she did not have custody of SS because the Idaho judge was 
a close "rafting buddy" of Sweet, again well knowing that to be a lie and failing to 
mention the true circumstances surrounding her loss of custody in 2110. 
(Temporary custody testimony on 9-4-2014). Perhaps sadly, none of that 
represents any material change in Foreman's ethics or conduct. 
Foreman has produced numerous reports from medical and counseling 
professionals in the Spokane area to support her position. Those reports are given 
limited evidentiary weight by the court ... 
R. Vol. I, p. 42, LL 7-20. Having made this point, the magistrate then goes on to credit those 
reports and find that SS is not happy living with his father: "The mere fact that a boy who grew up 
on a family farm in Bonner's Ferry with his father would consistently express a preference to move 
to a "R. Vol. L p. Ll. 19-21. The statements to 
which the magistrate refers were made to counselors, while [SS] was with Foreman, and mostly in 
her presence. 
The only counselor to interview SS in Idaho, Angie Crawford thought her investigation 
6 
a court Although 
unaware was 
1ru,,na·nn,,r1 by his mother, having already been interviewed by at least three different counselors. 
5/21/15 p. Ll. 18-25. However, Crawford did report that, " ... [W]hen I met with [SS] in 
September of 2014 he said it had gotten better." Tr. 5/21/15 p. 67, Ll. 10-11. Crawford did not 
tell Sweet she had a court order when he refused to speak with her. Tr. 05/21/15, p. 167, LI. 3-5. 
Crawford obtained most of her information from Foreman, including collateral references; Denise 
McGinnis was a friend and ex co-worker of Foreman's. Tr. 05/21/15, p.68, Ll. 24-25. 
Crawford stated that the school was concerned how Sweet would react to the CPS investigation. 
Tr. 05/21/15, p.68, LI. 16-17. However, the school principal did not seem to remember having 
any unusual trouble with Sweet when he met with him to discuss SS' behavior in school. 5/21 p. 
50, Ll. 10-12. The principal at SS' school also seemed to believe that SS behaved like a normal 
boy his age. School records show that SS' grades went up substantially from August 2014 to 
April 2015. 5/21115, p. 146, LI. 21-24. 
Not only did Crawford not know that Foreman had kidnapped SS, but she was also 
unaware that Foreman had previously been found to have neglected SS: 
Q: If you knew that [SS] had been discovered in the streets of Spokane with his 
shoes on backwards, his diaper dirty, having crossed four different intersections, 
when his mother was in Tri-Cities, would that alter your opinion about the ability of 
the mother to protect the child. 
A: It sounds like the child wasn't even with the mother when the child was found. 
So not necessarily, no. 
Q: Would it alter your opinion if the mother had left the child with caregivers who 
didn't take care of him and was working in another town when she had custody of 
him? 
A: If she had knowledge of their inabiiity to care for her child or concerns based 
on past experiences and then still let her child go with them, then yes, I would have 
concerns about that protectiveness. 
5/21/15 p. Ll. 13-23. SS in violation of 
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court 
Finally, Foreman alleges that, "SS was drawing sketches of his father ... " Respondent's 
11, L. 7. There was onlv one drawirnL That drawim;i: was introduced into evidence hv "" - '""" ' - - - - - ,,; 
Foreman. There is no evidence as to when it was sketched. We only have Foreman's word for it 
that it was even SS' sketch. We have no information as to the circumstances involved, or the 
significance, if any, that the sketch may have. No expert evidence has been introduced to the 
effect that such a sketch is not, for example, the artistic expression of an ordinarily mischievous 
little boy who opposes parental authority. It is not possible to substantiate a finding that SS is 
"consistently and significantly unhappy living with his father on the family farm" from such a 
The magistrate's finding that "this is not the sketching of a happy, well-adjusted child," 
begs the question, where the child is in counseling for anxiety. 
The memorandum states: "There is no evidence that [SS] has told any his counselors 
that he wants to continue living with his father." R. Vol. I, p. 43, Ll. 11-13. This is true, 
however, Sweet testified in court that SS admitted that he lied to the counselors. "I said, [SS] are 
you really afraid of me? And he goes, "No dad," he said, "I just said that to em." Tr. 5/21/15, 
41, LI. 23-24. Unlike Foreman, Sweet has not been found to be deceptive or manipulative of the 
court system. testified under oath at SS told him that he wants to stay 
Ferry and go to school with his friends. Tr. 5/21115, p. 181, LI. 10-12. It is Sweet's position that 
the instability caused by Foreman's actions, her kidnapping SS, the attempts to use his statements 
to substantiate a change in custody, are the chief causes of the child's anxiety and unhappiness. 
that was 
8 
unsupported substantial evidence. 
not was 
telephone presence of Foreman. Partners with Children had called Washington CPS and 
Foreman was told to go to Idaho CPS because that's where the abuse was alleged to have occurred. 
The next day, August 28, 2014, Foreman called Partners with Children and put SS on the 
telephone. SS then disclosed, over the telephone, in the presence of his mother, that abuse had 
happened in Washington, and that he didn't like Michelle. Exhibit 1, p.6, Ll.19-20. This was 
how Washington CPS became involved. 
Michelle testified that Foreman is the one who has a problem with the new stepmother: 
" ... the previous weekend she had-when I picked up [SS], Mother's Day, she said 
that I will never be able to pick up [SS] ever again, by myself without Philip, and 
she told Philip the same thing. And Philip said, well you know, she's my wife. 
And it was Mother's Day because-it was Mother's Day and I was in town. So 
the following weekend I went to pick up [SS] because Philip was busy and I get 
there and Rebecca was already out of her car and early, which was--doesn't 
happen, and-so I didn't have my phone on video right as I'm pulling in, but 
Rebecca was out of her car and when I pulled up she was by my window. And 
she'd looked in and said, "Well, where's Philip?" and I said, "He's not here," and 
she said, "Well [SS]'s just not going with you." And she turned around and 
walked away and went back to the driver's side of her car. And I said, "Rebecca 
what was that, you're not gonna let me have [SS]? I just drove down from 
Bonner's to pick him up and drive him back." And she got in her car and [SS] was 
looking at me and I worded to him, "Let's go, get out of the car." And he got his 
stuff together and he was getting out of the car and Rebecca reached back and 
grabbed him and kept him in the car and then talked to him. And then I saw her 
phone going up a couple of times and I just kept recording and then two minutes 
later I saw [SS] lean forward give her a hug and got out of the car and came and got 
in with me. 
And when [SS] got in the car with me he said, "Were you really-" I-well you' 11 
hear it- "were you really recording that?" And I said, "Yes," and he said, "Oh, 
cause my mom wasn't going to let me go until she saw that you were recording." 




5, a Group Health counselor report states: "Father has new girlfriend that he recently 
married and she was bad towards SS but now she is becoming nicer according to SS." Exhibit 4, 
p. 28. LI. 
There is substantial evidence that SS does like Michelle. Sweet testified that SS likes 
Michelle, and enjoys the family time together when they converse about events at the end of the 
day. Sweet testified: " ... as far as my circumstances, they've gotten better because I'm married 
and Michelle really likes SS and they do a lot of fun stuff together when I'm out doin whatever I do 
on the farm. Tr. 5/21/15 p. 183, LI. 15-18. As stated in appellant's brief, Sweet describes family 
time in the evening with SS and Michelle: 
"We talk about stuff and we say our prayers and then he goes to bed. And 
he's-he never fusses going to bed. He's always ready to go to bed. And now 
Michelle cooks supper every night that she's there and we sit down and we spend at 
least an hour a night eatin dinner, talkin about what goes on, who's doin what, what 
happened at school, who's-who's bein a jerk that day and who's bein nice, and he 
really likes that. He likes to go over the-recap the day of school. He likes that. 
A.nd him and Michelle have been <loin dinner and the dishes every night. SS's been 
doin the dishes and he's getting to where he doesn't mind em. At first he really 
didn't like that, but now he likes that cause that gives him and Michelle time to 
hang out and Micheile' s teachin him how to cook." 
Tr.05/21/15,p.176, Ll.18-25;p.177, Ll.1-2. Sweetunderstandsthedeferencethatmustbepaid 
to the magistrate's findings of fact and as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence. However, substantial evidence is that which a reasonable trier of fact would accept and 
rely upon in determining findings of fact. Duspiva v. Fillmore, 154 Idaho 27,293 P.3d 651, at 
655 (2013). A reasonable trier of fact would not rely upon the statements of Foreman, or upon the 
statements of a nine-and-a-half year old child under Foreman's control, speaking on the telephone 
where there is no way to 
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court to an 
not Michelle the matter came to trial. 
The magistrate's belief that SS wanted to live with Foreman and her boyfriend, Ryan 
Cornwell, in Spokane, was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Neither party brought SS to court to testify as to his wishes. As Sweet stated: 
[SS] said, "I don't wanna do it Dad." He says, "Cause I don't wanna make Mom 
mad." And I said, "What's that?" And he said, "I like goin' to school here," and I 
said. "Why do you like school here?" and he said, "Because of all my friends and I 
really like Ms. Nishek." And he come runnin' home from school one night and he 
goes, "Guess what Dad, guess what?" And I said, "What did you do something 
good at school?" And he goes, "No, Ms. Nishek is going to move from third grade 
to fourth grade with us next year so I'll have her for another year." And I said, "Do 
you like going to your Mom's?" And he says, "Yes I like to go down there 
because I get to play video games and me and Ryan do stuff, but," he says, "I don't 
wanna live in Spokane. But," he says, "but I don't wanna tell mom cause she'll 
mad at me." 
5/21/15, 175, LI. 23-25;p.176, Ll.1-6. Thecourtfoundthat"Themerefactthataboywho 
grew up on a family farm in Bonner's Ferry with his father would consistently express a preference 
to move to a city environment with his mother is striking." R. Vol. I, p. 43, LI. 19-21. However, 
this preference was only inconsistently expressed, only when Foreman took SS to see counselors, 
only in August and September of 2014, when SS had been taken from his home and was in the 
control of his mother. 
The magistrate emphasized what a 
LL 4-5. However, in one of the reports, SS states that Ryan was" ... really nice to my mom the 
first few years but the last year he got really mean to my mom." Exhibit L, p. 4, LI.; 18-19. The 




that SS would to with Foreman in house, or that 
had formed any significant relationship with SS. 
d. The facts do not support 8n award of L'nstody to Foreman het'nmie the intereds of the 
child are best served where be will experience stability and continuity, and is encouraged to 
have frequent and continuing contact with both parents. 
"To now suggest as the Appellant does, the Magistrate should have found significant 
interactions with parents and the community, is requesting a second guessing of the evidence." 
Respondent's brief p. 11, Ll. Respondent ignores that the Magistrate did find that SS had 
significant interactions with parents and the community. Furthermore, SS' interactions with 
~-·-· ... u. grandparents, and the community were a significant factor in the magistrate's custody 
decision in 2012. That custody order was upheld by the Court of Appeals on appeal in its 2015 
unpublished memorandum opinion No. 606. In that opinion, the Court of Appeals stated: 
The magistrate found that the child had been attending school; was involved 
in extracurricular activities; and had a family support network in place, 
emphasizing the child's very close relationship with his grandmother and 
grandfather. All of these factors led the magistrate to conclude that it was in the 
child's best interest to remain with Sweet. Accordingly, the magistrate considered 
the proper factors and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in making its custody 
determination. 
V. Unpublished Opinion 606, p. 8, At the appellate 
opinion was entered upholding the magistrate's determination that custody should remain with 
Sweet, magistrate had already issued his most recent custody order, awarding primary physical 
custody to Foreman. The changes that occurred the interim did not warrant a change 
a events 
status 
The factors considered by the court included that Ryan's children were involved sports, 
implying that SS would be encouraged to participate in sports SS lived with her and Ryan in 
Snokane. However. Foreman testified in court that SS is not interestecl in snorts. that he onlv does 
-i ./ - --- -----------------~---------------------------------r----:,--------- ----.., -----
them because his dad makes him. Tr. 06/04114, p. 38, LI. 23-24. There is no evidence Foreman 
encourages SS to participate in sports. 
Sweet testified to the trouble he has taken in his efforts to support SS participation in 
sports; unfortunately, while Foreman drives to Bonner's Ferry on Thursdays to pick SS pursuant to 
the schedule, she doesn't want to stay long enough to allow SS to compete in Thursday school 
events: 
Thursday's [SS] gets off the school bus and we drive right down here. I would like 
to see if we could move it to Friday mornings so that [SS] could have Thursday 
nights here. And now that he's getting older I would like-he wants to do some 
more sports. Rigi'lt now he only does wrestling and on the weekends that his 
mother has him she doesn't take him to the tournaments. 
Well, he's done soccer, basketball cause he's really tall-he's been talkin about 
doin basketball, and then I think next year, in fourth grade, he can start football. 
And most of the practices are Tuesday's and Thursday's for different size kids, and 
so ifhe practices on Tuesday he can't go to the game on Thursday, and so he--this 
year he said, I don't wanna play basketball cause I can never go to the games. 
Because his mom picks him up at five o'clock. 
5/21/15, p. 180, Ll. 14-25. Asked whether Foreman could take SS to his games, Sweet stated, 
"She could but she refuses. Cause she said that I schedule this stuff just to take away from her 
time." Id. Foreman testified that she did not refuse, but that, instead, she had never been told of 
the school's sports schedule. Tr. 06/04115 p. 38, Ll. 15-19. 
The magistrate has had ample evidence of the lack of cooperation from Foreman, in every 
aspect of the parties' co-parenting obligations: 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF Page 13 
R. Vol. 
risk and neglect. Since losing custody, she never once voluntarily paid any 
support, even though she earns a substantial income, and currentiy owes 
Sweet a significant child support arrearage as a result. 
D. 45. Ll. 5-l l. Foreman also admitted_ unon the magistrate's auestioning_ that she JI. , - - --~-:, --r--- ---- -----0-------- - -1---------------Q-:; - - ----
never offered to swap time or accommodate SS being able to attend the family round up. Tr. 
06/04/ 15, p. 7 5, Ll. 1-3. Sweet testified that the Sweet family round-up was a very big deal for the 
Sweet famiiy, that relatives come from Coeur d'Alene, from Nevada, Montana, and even Hawaii, 
to attend, and that it is also a community event. Tr. 5/21/15 p.178, Ll.20- 25; p. 179, Ll. 1-10 . 
... [Foreman's] scheduled weekend is the first weekend and Mother's Day is the 
next weekend, and then the third weekend is her scheduled weekend, and so my 
round-up that...Sawyer's favorite cousin J.B. comes up to help with and another 
cousin usually makes it up-Ty, Ty Bell, and so he [SS] hasn't got to come up the 
last two years. This year a little girl that he went to preschool, kindergarten, first 
grade and second grade, who is being home schooled now, she--it was her birthday 
and she ask her mom and dad if they could come to the round up so they could see 
[SS], so he missed out on seeing a girl that he's known for five years, that he 
doesn't get to see very often." 
Tr.5121/15, 178, LI. 9-16. Because Mother's Day was Foreman's custodial time with SS, the 
Sweet family changed the date of the Sweet family round-up. Tr. 5/21/1,5 p. 179, Ll. 9-10. [SS] 
was still unable to attend, because the weekends were fixed, and Foreman was allotted the 
weekends before and after Mother's Day as well. This is an example of Foreman's unwillingness 
bonding with father, or the ties the community Bonner's Ferry, 
as well as her lack of sympathy for her son's wishes: 
Oh, he was-he was mad. Very mad that he didn't get to go to the round up. 
He--he likes it. He's big enough now that he can catch calves with the rope and 
stuff. So he was pretty upset. And I could tell in his demeanor when he-that's 
why he wouldn't talk to his mom all week. wouldn't pick up the phone 
wanna to " 
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thing called facetime, and that's totally up to him ifhe answers it or not. It's not up to me. I told 
him, I said, "If you wanna talk to your mother go ahead." Tr. 5121/15, p.160, Ll. 1-3. If SS 
doesn't want to talk to his mother, Foreman then e:Hll'< ~wef't to e:omphit,· "Tm:t t},i" liNt Monday 
she called me fifteen times." Tr. 5/21115, p.160, Ll.13-14. "And then on the ... lih and 18th she 
called me seventeen times. And from May ih to May 1 oth she called me twenty-two times." Tr. 
5/21/15, p.160, LI. 16-18. "And she texts me that I'm abusing SS by not letting her talk to him." 
Tr. 5/21115, p.160, L. 25. 
It is incredible that, under such circumstances, the magistrate would consider awarding 
custody of SS to Foreman. Sweet provided ample evidence of SS' community contacts, 
emphasizing the factors of stability and continuity, that SS experiences with support from the 
Bonner's Ferry community. Kim Fields has been working with [SS] for four years. Tr. 5/21115, 
p.91. LI. 6. She testified as to SS' activities in Awanas: 
... [I]t' s kind of like a Sunday school thing, where he goes and we have some sort of 
bible story and then we hae ascripture memorization time where he learns a line or 
two of scripture and the meaning behind it. And by learn it I mean memorize it. 
He has to not-he has to not read it and just say it-he has to be able to just say it to 
me. And then we have game time. 
Tr. 5121115, p.88, LI. 6-10. Ms. Fields goes on to describe SS' behavior: 
He's a handful and, um, the other helpers that help with the program are older and 
they tend to be stricter with the kids, and I found that [SS] works best if he can 
wiggle around. And since I was one of the younger people there they assigned me 
to work with [SS]. And that became my main purpose on Wednesday nights, is to 
help him learn his scripture lines and to help him during game time because he 
behaved better for me than for some of the grouchier, older people that work there. 
Tr. 5121115, p.87, Ll. 19-24. Ms. Fields further exemplified the benefits of living in a small town, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF Page 15 
ever see 
the--coming to Awana, and then he comes to church occasionally and, uh, and 
sports and soccer and movie nights I tend to see him with SS." 
5/21/15, p.88, LI. 18-23. Asked specifically about Sweet's hot temper, Ms. Fields responded: 
If I would say anything about his temper, he can be loud and tell you what he's 
thinking. But I do that too. So I wouldn't say that I was hot tempered either, but 
yea, I wouldn't say that he had a hot temper. In my experience. I haven't been 
around him at home. Just at games and sports and church. And when SS 
misbehaves and I have to get Phil involved, he very firmly tells [SS] to be 
respectful and he will very firmly put [SS] in a seat and have him sit there. That's 
the extent of his temper that I've seen. 
Tr. 5/21/15, p.89, LI. 8-13. Ms. Fields testified that she has never seen [SS] appear to be afraid of 
Sweet, Tr. 5/21/15, p.89, LI. 14-15, and her testimony indicates that Sweet handles SS' 
misbehavior appropriately: 
If it's obvious that [SS] is having a bad day Phil will say and hang out at Awana to 
help keep [SS] in line. And in those instances if [SS] can't keep his hands to 
himself, cause he tends to just get in your personal space with the other kids, um, 
he'll grab him by the arm and escort him from the room and have his sit in a chair. 
And that's the most physical I've seen. When [SS] is being, um, just a little bit, 
he'll just tell him-say his name and tell him to calm down and [SS] calms down. 
Tr. 5121/15, p.89, Ll.19-24. It is difficult to read the magistrate's memorandum opinion, and 
reconcile the court's findings with the court's ultimate conclusions. In support of the award to 
Foreman, there is only the fact that she has moved into a four-bedroom house with no lease or 
boyfriend, with whom she admits had a rocky relationship 
requiring her to find lodging with a co-worker. Foreman had a perfectly suitable home of her own 
in Spokane in 2010 and 2012, when the magistrate awarded custody to Sweet. At the time of trial 
in 201 Foreman had lived with Mr. Cornwell for less than a year. 
was 
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contact 
other parent. When 
to 
to 
was a child of tender years, Sweet did not 
and was fine with Foreman having custody, until SS was found, soiled and crying, 
wandering the streets of Spokane, at age 4, and Sweet got custody because SS was unsafe with 
Foreman. Sweet did not request the magistrate to reduce Foreman's weekend visitation; the 
magistrate did so in order to standardize a custody order that, in order to accommodate Foreman's 
changing work schedule, was too flexible to enforce. Sweet does not now request sole custody, 
even though this would be reasonable given Foreman's kidnapping and custodial interference, and 
given Foreman's propensity for making unilateral changes in SS' life. Unlike Foreman, Sweet 
recognizes the value of SS having frequent contact with both parents. 
Therefore, there is not substantial evidence supporting the magistrate's belief that SS is 
consistently and significantly unhappy living with Sweet on the farm, or that SS does not like 
Michelle Sweet, or that SS wanted to live with his mother. Even if there had been, those factors 
would be insufficient to override the many benefits that SS experiences living with his father on 
the farm, including the close relationship SS has with his grandparents, the stability and continuity 
of SS's daily routine, and contacts with his cousins, friends at school, church and community. 
Also, a significantly more important consideration, Foreman consistently and actively interferes 
and attempts to alienate the child's affection for his father. 
2. Was it an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow Sweet to present evidence in support 
of his motion to reconsider? 
a) The issue of whether the magistrate could hear Sweet's motion to reconsider after a 
""n't·.ap<l,ri WftS not nrlf'lilll'!"V&>O 
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on 
case, had already issued a final and the for the 
reconsideration was to have the Court reopen the case, in essence." Respondent's 
magistrate did not hold that the motion was prohibited subsequent to entry of the final 
judgment and did not refuse to hear the motion to reconsider: 
My view of the matter is that reconsideration, by its very term, means that 
you look at the evidence that's in the record and get to argue that evidence to the 
Court for the Court to reconsider its conclusions. There is some case law in this 
State that says that with respect to interlocutory orders that new evidence can be 
presented. But this is not, in my view, one of those situations. 
Tr. 08125/15, p. 1, Ll. 7-11. Although the magistrate decided that the court would not hear new 
ev1aer1ce. it then asked Sweet, "So with that understanding do you wish to argue your motion to 
reconsider?" 08/25115, p. 1, Ll. 18-19. 
Foreman did not object to the magistrate hearing Sweet's motion to reconsider during the 
in court on the motion, and, Foreman has not now cross-appealed against the magistrate's 
decision to hear Sweet's motion. The issue of whether the magistrate should have heard Sweet's 
motion to reconsider was not preserved as an issue on appeal. 
b) The court is required to hear a motion to reconsider after a final judgment had been 
entered, so long as it is timely filed within 14 days of entry of the final judgment. 
Foreman cites to Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 800 P.2d 
1026 (1990), for the proposition that a motion to reconsider only relates to an interlocutory order. 
Foreman is correct that the case involves an interlocutory order, however, however, the motion to 
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court 
after judgment had been entered following trial. 
800 P.2d at 1034. The Supreme Court explained: 
no new 
188 Idaho at 820, and 
We acknowled2:e that before this Court had adonted J.R.C.P. 1 Ha)(2)(Rt we had ._, - .r - - ,-,/, ./'\., /7 - -
ruled that a trial court correctly treated a motion for reconsideration of a 
memorandum decision following trial as a motion to alter or amend judgment 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e). Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 539, 567 P.2d 1284, 
1290 (1977). As our Court of Appeals correctly pointed out in Lowe v. Lym, 103 
Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1982) (Citations omitted.): 
A Rule 59( e) motion to amend a judgment is addressed to the discretion of the 
court. An order denying a motion made under Rule 59( e) to alter or amend a 
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a 
manifest abuse of discretion. Rule 59( e) proceedings afford the trial court the 
opportunity to correct errors both of fact or law that had occurred in its 
proceedings; it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action short of an 
appeal. Such proceedings must of necessity, therefore, be directed to the status of 
the case as it existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment 
is based. 
However, we view the function of the trial court to be different when presented 
with a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
l l(a)(2)(B). When considering a motion of this type, the trial court should take into 
account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of 
the interlocutory order. The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's 
attention to the new facts. We will not require the trial court to search the record to 
determine if there is any new information that might change the specification of 
facts deemed to be established. 
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 800 P.2d 1026 (Idaho 1990). In the 
matter of Kepler Fleenor v. Freemont 
Foreman, the Supreme Court held: 
1 Idaho 268 P.3d 1159 (2012), also cited by 
Appellants filed their Motion to Reconsider on March 31, 2010, two days after the 
final judgment was issued. [2] It was therefore timely and properly before the court. 
Id 152 Idaho at 210, 268 P .3d at 1162. The Supreme Court held that the motion to reconsider was 
timely, even though it was filed after the final judgment was issued, and therefore the affidavit 
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not on 
ll(a)(2)(B) therefore applies instead because it is the rule governing motions 
reconsideration. The district court was obligated to consider this new evidence. 
Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340,344, 179 P.3d 303,307 (2008). 
, 152 Idaho at 211,268 P.3d at 1163. Similarly, in Idaho First Nat. Bank v. David Steed and 
Associates, Inc., 121 Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992), the trial court erred in treating a motion to 
reconsider an interlocutory order as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60, 
because, as the Supreme Court expiained, "Rule 60(b) refers to the trial court relieving a party 
from "a final judgment, order, or proceeding." Id., 121 Idaho at 362,825 P.2d at 85. The Court 
did not address the issue of whether an aggrieved party may file a motion to reconsider a final 
order, only whether a 60(b) motion could be applied to an interlocutory order. 
Even if Sweet's motion to reconsider requested reconsideration of a final judgment, 
Foreman is incorrect; the trial court should have granted a meaningful hearing, and permitted new 
evidence to be presented, based upon both the civil and the family law rules. Foreman cites to 
Rule 503.B. of the Idaho Family Rules, acknowledging that the language is identical to I.R.C.P. 
1 l(a)(2)(B), but only provides the first half of the rule: 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made any time before the entry of final judgment but no later than fourteen (14) 
days after the entry of final judgment. 
p. 14, continues; language by 
Foreman states as follows: 
A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after entry of final 
judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days after the entry of such order; 
provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court 
entered on any motion filed under Rules 306, 802, 807, 808, and 809. 
language in 
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provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court 
entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 1, 
60(a), or 60(b). 
I.R.C.P. JI (a)(2)(B). None of the exceptions apply to a final judgment per se. ThPrf' i-:: nr. 
exception carved out, in either the family law rules or the civil rules, denying permission to file a 
motion for reconsideration of a final judgment. 
On page 15 of her brief, Foreman quotes the magistrate's complaint, repeated here in 
relevant part: "'For the Court to simply allow parties to keep calling more and new and different 
witnesses every time they don't like the result in a child custody case would be, well, it would 
speak for itself of how ridiculous that process would be.' Tr. 08/25/15, p. 1, LI. 14-16." This 
statement echoes that of the district court inAgrisource v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 912, 332 P.3d 
815, 824 (2014), cited in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, infra: 
In holding that Hymas' motion was procedurally improper, the district court was 
apparently concerned that if a party could make a motion for reconsideration of the 
denial of a motion for reconsideration, a party could move the court to reconsider 
an order denying a motion to reconsider, where the latter motion was made after the 
entry of final judgment, so long as the party did so within fourteen days of the 
order. In that event, a party could keep a case perpetually alive in the district court 
by filing an endless series of motions to reconsider orders denying motions to 
reconsider. 
JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820 P.2d 1206, 1210 (1991). 
The Supreme Court held: 
A motion for reconsideration of" any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen ( 14) 
days after the entry of final judgment" and " [a] motion for reconsideration of any 
order of the trial court made after entry of finai judgment may be filed within 
fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order .... " I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) 
...,,uvu,,0..:, added). a to a 
reconsideration of an order a motion for reconsideration. 
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a to a to is 
the court to reconsider the underlying interlocutory order," a motion to reconsider 
an order denying a motion to reconsider an order granting summary judgment is a 
motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment. Id. at 824-25. 
The district court's order granting summary judgment was an interlocutory order. 
So, where the underlying order is a summary judgment order, LRC.P. l l(a)(2)(B) 
requires that any motion asking the court to reconsider an order denying a motion 
for reconsideration--no matter how many motions for reconsideration preceded 
it--rnust be made within fourteen days of the entry of final judgment. 
What Foreman ignores is that the orders Sweet requested the court to reconsider were 
interlocutory. Foreman admits in her brief that, "The change of custody occurred by the ruling in 
the Memoranda Opinion regarding child custody, child support and miscellaneous issues." 
Respondent's brief, p. 1, Ll. 5-7. The Memoranda Opinion referenced by Foreman is an 
interlocutory order. Furthermore, the Order to Modify Child Custody, Child Support and 
Miscellaneous Issues is an interlocutory order, R. Vol. I, p. 60-67, filed concurrently with the final 
judgment, R. Vol. I, p. 68-77, to which it was also attached as an exhibit. Id. 
c) It was an abuse of discretion not to consider or allow new evidence in support of 
Sweet's motion to reconsider. 
The magistrate agreed to hear Sweet's motion to reconsider, but refused to allow or 
consider new evidence: "Argue the evidence in the record where you think it shows that my 
decision was incorrect. And that's what reconsideration is about." Tr. 08125/15, p. 1, L. 25; p.2, 
L. l. The magistrate erred; all of the case law in this State says that new evidence can be 
presented, and that the court must consider new evidence in a hearing on a motion to reconsider. 
Having decided to hear the motion, it was an abuse of discretion for the magistrate to refuse to 
consider new evidence in support of reconsideration. 
Sweet's motion to reconsider was filed 201 R. L motion is 
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to alter judgment or for new trial. pretends that, because Sweet 
not appeal the magistrate's denial of his motion to alter judgment or for new trial, those pleadings 
were not before the court. However the magistr::ite is free to con.;:irler ::ill the nle::iilino,: in thP · o r o 
record on file with the trial court, and Sweet's motion specifically references the affidavits and 
exhibits filed concurrently in his motions to alter or amend or for new trial, as well as those filed in 
support of his motion to reconsider, and in supplement thereof as new facts occurred daily at that 
time, demonstrating the need for the court to attend to the child's altered circumstances. The 
magistrate also took judicial notice of the ex-parte hearing in Boundary County Case No. 
CV-2015-312, wherein Foreman again requested, and was again denied, a temporary restraining 
order against Sweet. Although the magistrate denied the petition, the court referred to Foreman's 
allegations contained in the petition, and took judicial notice of that proceeding when it 
adjudicated the weekend schedule on August 31, 2015.2 Thus, the magistrate was already aware 
changing circumstances warranting a hearing. 
The child's letter requesting the magistrate to allow him to remain in Bonner's Ferry 
"because that is my home" should have put the magistrate on notice that his conclusions as to the 
wishes of the child were incorrect. Sweet requested the court to permit an en camera review, 
the could for itself, the absence of any coaching or interference from 
the parties, what the true, current, wishes of the child actually were, almost a year after SS had 
been kidnapped and interviewed by Foreman's counselors. 
Therefore, the magistrate neglected his primary duty, to ensure the best interests of the 


